Limitations on Public Release and Disclosures About Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat/Efforts

Military Professional Development Center: "RTTUZYUW RUEWMCS0000 1781820-UUUU--RUCRNAV.
ZNR UUUUU
R 271820Z JUN 06
FM SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
TO ALNAV
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UNCLAS
ALNAV 056/06"
MSGID/GENADMIN/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC//SUBJ/LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC RELEASE AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND/TECHNICAL DATA ABOUT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) DEFEAT/EFFORTS//GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS MESSAGE EMPHASIZES COMPLIANCE WITH POLICIESGOVERNING THE PUBLIC RELEASE AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ANDTECHNICAL DATA ABOUT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED) DEFEATEFFORTS, PARTICULARLY INFORMATION BRIEFINGS FOR DEPLOYED COALITIONFORCES. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY (DON) PERSONNEL SHALL ONLY RELEASE ORDISCLOSE IED-DEFEAT INFORMATION THAT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITHINFORMATION SECURITY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS/DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATIONREGULATIONS AND POLICIES (SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5510.36 AND 5720.44B).ACCORDINGLY, DON PERSONNEL SHALL BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT TO ENSURETHAT INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL DATA RELATED TO IED-DEFEAT EFFORTS,AS OUTLINED IN THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON"DISCUSSION OF IEDS AND IED-DEFEAT EFFORTS IN OPEN SOURCES," DATED24 APRIL 2006 ... BE HANDLED AS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYAT A MINIMUM, OR AS CLASSIFIED IF DEEMED SO BY AN APPROVED SECURITYCLASSIFICATION GUIDE OR AUTHORITY.2. IEDS ARE A SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL THREAT TO COALITIONFORCES DEPLOYED IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM) AREA OFOPERATIONS (AO). THE JOINT IED-DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO) IS AJOINT COMBINED INTERAGENCY PROGRAM TASKED TO LEVERAGE ALL AVAILABLERESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES IN A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN TO DEFEAT THEIED THREAT. DON HAS BEEN THE DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR JOINTEXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL COUNTERMEASURES TECHNOLOGY AND TRAININGREQUIREMENTS SINCE 1971, AND WAS RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS THE LEADSERVICE FOR COUNTER RADIO-CONTROLLED IED ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURESTECHNOLOGY. IN VIEW OF THE CRITICAL PART THAT IED INFORMATION ANDTECHNICAL DATA PLAY IN IED-DEFEAT EFFORTS, DON PERSONNEL MUSTUNDERSTAND THAT FOLLOWING APPLICABLE INFORMATION SECURITY,DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, AND OPERATIONS SECURITY POLICIES PLAY ANIMPORTANT ROLE IN SUPPORTING COALITION IED-DEFEAT EFFORTS.3. INSURGENT FORCES IN THE USCENTCOM AO CAN USE PUBLIC MEDIA, THEINTERNET, AND INFORMATION GLEANED FROM PRIVATE, PROFESSIONAL ANDTECHNOLOGY FORUMS TO GAIN INSIGHTS INTO COALITION IED-DEFEATEFFORTS. THEREFORE, INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL DATA ABOUT IED-DEFEATEFFORTS, PARTICULARLY COUNTERMEASURE TECHNOLOGIES, DEFEAT TACTICS,TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTP), AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANDDOCTRINAL INITIATIVES, MUST BE PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICRELEASE OR DISCLOSURE.4. ATTENTION TO DOD PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND INFORMATION SECURITYPOLICIES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PROTECTING AGAINST UNAUTHORIZEDPUBLIC RELEASE OR DISCLOSURE OF IED-DEFEAT EFFORT INFORMATION ANDTECHNICAL DATA, AND WILL REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IEDS AGAINSTCOALITION FORCES. THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF INFORMATION MUST BEGUARDED AND CLASSIFIED APPROPRIATELY:(a) OUR SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY IED TTP, AND OUR ANALYSIS OFENEMY CAPABILITIES OR VULNERABILITIES;(b) FRIENDLY FORCE EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OROPERATIONAL VULNERABILITIES;(c) SPECIFIC FRIENDLY FORCE TECHNOLOGY AREAS OR DETAILS,ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES, AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES DESIGNED TOCOUNTER IEDS;(d) SPECIFIC EXPLOITATION TTP;(e) PHOTOS OF OR INFORMATION ABOUT VEHICLES OR EQUIPMENT THAT HAVEBEEN DAMAGED BY AN IED;(f) PHOTOS OF OR INFORMATION ABOUT RECOVERED COMPONENTS OF AN IED;(g) LOCALLY PRODUCED BRIEFINGS; NOTE - THE MINIMUM LEVELOF CLASSIFICATION FOR ANY BRIEFING OR DOCUMENT RELATED TO IED-DEFEATEFFORTS IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. THE ASSOCIATION OF ANY OF THISINFORMATION WITH DEPLOYED TROOPS OR SPECIFIC LOCATIONS WILL NORMALLYMEAN IT SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AND AFFORDED AN APPROPRIATELY GREATERLEVEL OF PROTECTION. SPECIFIC CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE CAN BEOBTAINED FROM THE JOINT IED-DEFEAT ORGANIZATION. BRIEFINGS THAT AREDESIGNED TO IMPART INFORMATION TO SERVICE MEMBERS WHO ARE PREPARINGFOR DEPLOYMENT GENERALLY ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR PRESENTATION ORRELEASE TO THE PUBLIC (WHICH INCLUDES THE MEDIA); AND(h) IED COUNTERMEASURES CONSIST OF TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS AS WELL ASOPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, ALONG WITH ORGANIZATIONAL, AND DOCTRINALINITIATIVES. ALL MUST BE PROTECTED.5. THE FOLLOWING ARE APPROVED TALKING POINTS FOR ALL PERSONNEL:(a) THE IED THREAT AND ITS DEFEAT IS A TOP PRIORITY FOR DOD;(b) DOD IS DEVOTING SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES (EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL,AND TTP) TO DEFEATING IEDS;(c) THE JIEDDO WORKS WITH THE SERVICES AND ALL OF DOD TO DEVELOPINTEGRATED SOLUTIONS THAT BALANCE INTELLIGENCE, TRAINING ANDTECHNOLOGY;(d) THE IED ISSUE IS A COMPLICATED ONE, AND NO SINGLESOLUTION EXISTS TO DEFEAT IEDS. OUR STRATEGY INCLUDES THREECOMPONENTS:(1) TRAINING IS PARAMOUNT. THE BEST SENSOR AND WEAPON ONTHE BATTLEFIELD IS A WELL-TRAINED, SITUATIONALLY AWARE SOLDIER,SAILOR, AIRMAN OR MARINE.(2) KILLING OR CAPTURING BOMB MAKERS AND DISRUPTING OR ELIMINATINGTHEIR NETWORKS IS VITAL.(3) PROVIDING TROOPS ON THE BATTLEFIELD WITH EFFECTIVE,INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY ENABLES THE FIGHT.6. POC: CHINFO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER AT (703) 697-7391; MARINECORPS PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER AT (703) 614-4309; JIEDDO PUBLICAFFAIRS OFFICER AT (703) 601-3784.7. RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY THE HONORABLE DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARYOF THE NAVY.//BT#0000NNNN

[bth: this action has effectively removed all objective journalism from embedded reporters. It has resulted in a total loss of American public awareness of the IED threat except in the most abstract of forms. It has hidden the military deficiencies in IED jamming and countermeasure efforts from public scrutiny or criticism. It has resulted in a total deletion of photographs of destroyed or damaged vehicles. Rather than fix the vehicles, Rumsfeld has seen fit to fix the media by classifying their deficiencies. .... Do insurgents know the vulnerabilities? Evidently so. Do they know our countermeasures? Evidently they know a great many of them as they video tape our convoys and no doubt measure electronic emissions from those vehicles. Determining if a frequency is being jammed for say a certain radio or tv remote would be as easy for an insurgent as trying to open their garage door with their remote when a convoy goes by or simply trying to place a cell phone or radio call when the convoy is in the area. The net result of this sweeping proclaimation is that the American public is blinded to the threat its troops face. A stunning solution I must say to a politically sensitive issue - force protection measures - vehicle armor, body armor, IED jammers (or lack there of) - simply classify everything up to and including photographs. ... when troops wonder if the public cares, they should now ask themselves if the public knows!]